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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
THE NEW FORFEITURE CLAUSE TEST IN EXECUTORY
CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF REAL ESTATE
The principle of Ashford v. Reese1 does not yet seem to have
come to rest. In the recent case of Aylward v. LallyZ the supreme
court has added another chapter on the legal relationship of vendor
and purchaser, the incidents of which in this state at the present
tune are none too well defined.
In the case referred to the court uses the following language:
"No one of these cases is referred to or overruled by
the prevailing opinion in Ashford v. Reese, 132 Wash.
649, 233 Pacific 29, and the conclumon is irresistible that
the doctrine of that case, and of the prior cases upon
which it is based, is limited to those contracts which by
their terms are forfeitable, and we now so hold."
A possible distinction in the lines of authority on the vendorpurchaser relation in this state, based on the presence or absence
of a forfeiture clause, was heretofore pointed out in this Law
Review and the suggestion made that such a distinction is unsound
in principle and without foundation in authority 4 .In the recent
Aylward case,5 the court, after setting out the time essence clause
which, among other things, provided that "the party of the first
part may declare a money default of the party of the second part
in the performance of this contract and shall be entitled to the immediate possession of said premises," says, "forfeiture is not mentioned in the contract." Therefore, the court concludes to follow
a line of authority to the effect that the purchaser under an executory contract on which payments remain to be made, but winch
does not contain a forfeiture clause, is the owner of "the full
equitable title," and that such an executory contract not containFor prior discussions of this
1132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29 (1925).
famous case see: P John Lichty, Rights and Estates of Vendor and Vendee
under an executory Contract for the Sale of Realty, (1925) 1 WAsH. L.
REv. 9; Alfred J. Schweppe, Rights of a Vendee under an Executory Forfeitable Contract for the Purchase of Real Estate: A Further Word on the
Washington Law, (1926) 2 WAsHf. L. REV. 1; (1927) 2 WAsEL L. Rzv. 205,
and George D. Lantz, Rights of Vendees under Executory Contracts of
Sale, (1928) 3 WASH. L. Rsv. L
'47 Wash. Dec. 41 (decided March 8, 1928).
* Taylor -v.Interstate Investment Co., 75 Wash. 490, 135 Pac. 240
Roy v. Vaughn, 100 Wash. 345, 170 Pac. 1019 (1918) Barton v.
(1913)
Shelton v. Jones, 4 Wash.
Tombari, 120 Wash. 331, 207 Pac. 239 (1922)
St. Paul 4 Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Boltor, 5
692, 30 Pac. 1061 (1892)
Wash. 763, 32 Pac. 787 (1893).
' (1926) 2 WASH. L. 1lEv. 1, at p. 9.
*See note 2, supra.
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img. a forfeiture clause is foreclosable in equity apparently after
the manner of an ordinary mortgage.
In support of this proposition the court cites a fumber of authorities. The first case referred to, Taylor v. The Interstate Investment Company is one in which the court had before it a contract
not containing a forfeiture clause and it was held that the purchaser -would in equity be regarded as having acquired the property i the land, and the vendor as having acquired the property
in the price. This case may therefore be said to support the new
criterion.
The next case referred to by the court in the recent case as supporting a distinction based upon the presence or absence of the
forfeiture clause is Roy v. Vaughn. The court seems to have completely overlooked the fact that in Roy v. Vaughn" the contract
9
was executory and contained a forfeiture clause. In Roy v.
0
Vaughn,' although the contract contained a forfeiture clause, the
court nevertheless authoriz'ed foreclosure of the contract in equity,
stating that the relation between the parties was that of mortgagor
and mortgagee. It has already been heretofore pointed out in this
Review"1 that it has been constantly overlooked that Roy v.
Vaughn, 2 when analyzed upon its facts, appears to constitute a
complete overruling of that line of cases, largely dicta, on which the
4
8
rule of Ashford v. Reese,' seems to be based. In Roy v. Vaugin,"
the forfeiture clause was directly in issue and was not overlooked.
The original complaint sought enforcement of the forfeiture
clause; the amended complaint sought recovery of the balance due,
to have that amount declared a lien, and to have the lien foreclosed. The point was squarely decided that this change did not
constitute an election of remedies, because certain conditions precedent to invoking the forfeiture clause had not been complied
with. Roy v. Vaughn" then appears to stand for the doctrine
'75 Wash. 490, 135 Pac. 240 (1913).
'100 Wash. 345, 170 Pac. 1019 (1918).
See note 7, supra.
,In Roy v. Vaughn, Respondents Brief, p. 2, it is said: "The contract
in usual form and contains a forfeiture paragraph."
is
20See note 7, supra.
u (1926) 2 WAsH. L. REv. 1, 6-8.
"See note 7. supra.
U See note 1, supra. That the early cases are largely dicta on this subject is pointed out by P. John LIchtly, note 1, supra; and by Chief Justice
Tolman in his dissent in Ashford v. Reese.
24See note 7, supra.
U See note 7, supra.
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that even though a contract contains a forfeiture clause it may be
foreclosed in equity after the manner of an ordinary mortgage,
on the theory that in eqity the purchaser is the owner of the
land. Hence, in citing Roy v. Vaughn' in support of the distinction sought to be made in the case of Aylward v. Lally,'7 the court
seems to have completely overlooked what was actually held in
Roy v. Vaughn,'" and that the underlying principle of Roy v.
Vaughn,' is in conflict with the doctrine of Ash ford v. Reese,20
inasmuch as the contracts involved in both cases contain forfeiture
clauses.
The next case cited by the court in the recent case of Aylward v.
Lally 2 is Barton v. Tombart.2 2 In that case Roy v. Vaughn,"
was followed even though the contract did not contain a forfeiture
provision.
The last two cases cited by the court in the recent case of
Aylward v. Lally" are Shelton v. Jones,25 and St. Paul & Tacoma
Lumber Co. v. Bolton. 6 An examination of the opinions, briefs,
and records in those cases discloses, first, that no forfeiture clause
was involved in the contracts in question, and, second, that the
presence or absence of a forfeiture clause was Pot even referred
to or a determining factor in the mind of the court. In the early
days. of course, forfeiture clauses had not yet taken on any semblance of importance, since in those days this state followed the
general equitable rule.From an analvsis thus far it appears that the announcement of

'See note 7, supra.
1'See note 2, supra.
" See note 7. supra.
"See note 7, supra.
"See note 1, supra.
See note 2,supra,
"120 Vash. 331, 207 Pac. 239 (1922) affirmed on rehearing 124 Wash.
696, 214 Pac. 170 (1923).
a See note 7, supra.
"See note 2, supra.
"4 Wash. 692, 30 Pac. 1061 (1892).
"5 Wash. 763, 32 Pac. 787 (1893).
"See especially State ex rcl. Trtmble v. Superior Court, 31 Wash. 445.
72 Pac. 89 (1903), a case which in modern times has been completely overlooked, as pointed out in 2 WASH. L. REV. L and in which, although the
contract involved contained a forfeiture clause, the court expressly repudiates the doctrine which is now the rule of the court, stating that the
doctrine of the vendee's equitable ownership is "so firmly settled against
the contention of the relators by a train of uncontroverted authority that
it is now beyond the realm of legitimate controversy." See also Olson V.
Seattle, 30 Wash. 687. 71 Pac. 201 (1903), in which it was held that one
who has paid a substantial portion of the purchase price for real property
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the court in the recent case of Aylward v. Lally2 ' can technically
be sustained on the facts of four of the cases cited, but that Roy
v. Vaughn32 appears to be a misfit in this scheme of distinction.
The court says that none of the foregoing five cases which have
just been reviewed is referred to or overruled in the prevailing
opinion in Ashford v. Reese.3 That statement is correct, no doubt,
in so far as the want of reference is concerned. It may be
added that Roy v. Vaughn3l and Barton v. Tombari"' were not
referred to in either the majority or dissenting opinions in Ashford
v. Reese,"' and that the bearing of those two cases upon the controversy here in question was first pointed out elsewhere.3 ' The
other three cases cited, Taylor v. Interstate Investment Co.,35 Shelton v. Jones,3 8 and St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Boltortl
were referred to in the dissenting opinion in Ashford v. Reese."
One would assume, therefore, since these cases were the basis of the
dissent, that they must at the time of the rendition of the opinion in
Ashford v. Reese s9 have been regarded as wholly inconsistent -with
Ashford v. Reese,40 whereas now they are sought to be harmonized
has such an interest in land as to enable him to maintain an injunction
where public authorities seek to condemn the same without first making
compensation. As appears from an examination of the original record,
though not from the opinion itself, in Olson v. Seattle, supra, the contract
Involved (Plaintiff's Ex. A) contained a forfeiture clause in the following
language: "Failure to pay final payment as specified means forfeiture
of th~s amount." Both State ex rel Trumble v. Superior Court, supra, and
Olson v. Seattle, supra, were. condemnation cases, and in both, despite
the forfeiture clause, it was held that the vendee was the owner in equity
and therefore entitled to compensation. Both of these cases are squarely
opposed to Shaefer v. Gregory Co., 112 Wash. 408, 192 Pac. 968 (1920),
also a condemnation case, which is the foundation for Ashlford v. Reese.
In the first two cases it was held that the vendee under a forfeitable executory contract, being the equitable owner, was entitled to damages in a
condemnation proceeding, whereas in the Shaefer case (without reference
to the Trimble or Olson cases, supra, and without overruling them) the
court held that the vendee under a forfeitable executory contract was not
the equitable owner and therefore not entitled to damages in a condemnation proceeding.
. See note 2, supra.
"See note 7, supra.
30See note 1, supra.
3 See note 7, supra.
" See note 22, supra.
3 See note 1, supra.
"See note 11, supra.
3See note 3, supra.
" See note 3, supra.
"See note 3, supra.
" See note 1, supra.
"See note 1, supra.
, See note 1, supra.
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by the application of the forfeiture-clause criterion. If at the time
the opinion of Ashford v. Reese" was rendered it had been the
opinion of the court that the two lines of decisions referred to could
be harmonized upon. the oasis of the presence or absence of a forfeiture clause, it may be supposed that the court would have done
so, and that there would have been no dissenting opimons, but that
the dissenting judges would have concurred spec'ally on the ground
that there was no inconsistency between the two lines of authority
That these two lines of authority were at that time regarded as
totally inconsistent seems plain not only from the fact of dissent
itself but also from the language of the dissenting opinion of Judge
Tolman. That they were considered inconsistent seems likewise
plain from the majority opinion. While the court m the statement
of facts at the commencement of the majority opinion refers to the
fact that the contract provided that on default m payment the
seller would have the right to declare the contract null and void,
still the court in the later part of the opinion in discussing the
question at issue discusses it generally, making it rather plain that
the majority of the court did not regard the presence or absence of
forfeiture clause as a criterion.
Not only does it seem that the court at the time of the decimon of
Ashford v. Reese "' did not regard the two lines of authority as
reconcilable by the application of the forfeiture clause criterion,
but an examination of the cases decided since Ashford v. Reese"
in which that case has been cited shows quite plainly that the court
has considered at times at least that the doctrine of Ashford V.
Reese 4 is generally applicable to all executory contracts for the purchase or sale of real estate regardless of whether a forfeiture
clause is included m the contract.
Of the vendor and purchaser cases"- decided subsequent to AshSee note 1. supra.
" See note 1, supra.
,See note 1. supra.
"See note 1, supra.
"Holt Mfg. Co. v. Jaussand, 132 Wash. 667. 233 Pac. 35 (1926) In re
Kuhn's Estate, 132 Wash. 678, 233 Pac. 293 (1925), decided on same day as
Ashford v. Reese; Peck v. Farmer's National Bank, 137 Wash- 629, 243
Pac. 861 (1926) In re Field's Estate, 141 Wash. 526, 252 Pac. 534 (1927)
Desmond v. Shotwell, 142 Wash. 187, 252 Pac. 692 (1927) Norman v. Levenhagen, 142 Wash. 372, 253 Pac. 113 (1927) Pratt v. Rhodes, 142 Wash.
411, 253 Pac. 640, 256 Pac. 503 (1927)
Dusart v. Colonial Fire Under-

writers, 142 Wash. 601, 254 Pac. 240 (1927)

Kateiva v. Snyder, 143 Wash.

172, 254 Pac. 857 (1927)
Bank of California v. Clear Lake Lumber Co.,
46 Wash. Dec. 425, 264 Pac. 705 (1928).
The first case above cited. Holt Mfg. Co. v. Jaussand, decided on the
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ford v. Reese, 48 in which that case has been cited, several concerned contracts containing forfeiture clauses and need not therefore be further adverted to, but several others involve contracts
which either did not contain forfeiture clauses, or it did not appear
from the opinion of the court whether a forfeiture clause was contained in the contract or not. It is plainly deducible from the language of this last group of cases, which will now be taken up, that
the court considered the doctrine of Ashford v. Reese 47 generally
applicable without regard to the existence or non-existence of a forfeiture clause in the contract involved in the case before the
coult.
The first case of this group to be discussed is In re Fields
Estate.48 In that case the court, citing Ashford v. Reese, 9 says:
"While it is true that no title passed to the vendee under the executory contract from Fields to Bethel, nevertheless, for the purpose of administration it (the vendor's
interest) shoeld be treated as personal property rather
than real property."
That this language constitutes confusion between the new doetrine in this state and the old equitable doctrine, inasmuch as the
probate rule that the vendor's interest is.personalty is predicated
on the doctrine of equitable conversion, has already been pointed
same day as Ashford -v. Reese, involved a conditional sales contract of
personal property, the contract containing no forfeiture clause. In cases
involving conditional sales of personal property the presence or absence

of a forfeiture clause has apparently never been considered of moment
by the court, unless a tendency In that direction is to be deduced from the
recent case of West American Finance Co. v. Finstad, 46 Wash. Dec. .252,
262 Pac. 636 (1928). However that may be, it is to be observed that the
law of sales of personal property has historically had an entirely different
development, especially with respect to the doctrine of eqaitable conversion and the assumption of jurisdiction by courts of equity, from the law
of real property in personal property sales cases the remedy at law
has traditionalry been regarded as adequate and, generally speaking,
equity has declined jurisdiction. Although it has been forcefully argued
(George D. Lantz, Rights of Vendees under Executory Contracts of Sale,
(1928) 3 WASH. L. Rnv. 1) that logically the rule as to personalty and
realty should be the same, the differing treatments that the two kinds of
property have from almost time immemorial received in courts of equity,
cannot be left out of account.
Even under the Sales Act, § 22(a) (Laws of Wash. 1925, chap. 142,
p. 366) the risk Is on the buyer, Holt Mfg. Co. v. Jaussaund,supra, being
thei'eby undoubtedly changed. See Ayer, Uniform Sales Act ,n Washing.
ton, (1927) 2 WASH. L. Ray. 162.
"See note 1, supra.
"See note 1, supra.
' See note 45, supra.
'*See note 1, supra.
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out herein, 10 but, aside from that, the foregoing language was used
with reference to a real estate contract of which the court says.
"The contract itself is not before us, nor was it before
the lower court at the time of its final decree."
Here, then, the court is applying the doctrine of Ashford v.
Reese5l generally, although the contract is not in the record, and
therefore it cannot be known whether it contained a forfeiture
clause or not. The only deduction that can be drawn from these
circumstances is that the court at the time of the decision in that
case considered the doctrine generally applicable to executory real
estate contracts without any consideration being had of the existence or non-existence of a forfeiture clause.
The next case to be considered is Desmond v. ShotweU." In that
case, without adverting to the fact whether the contract in question contained a forfeiture clause or not (and it appears nowhere
in the opinion), the court says
"A single question is presented for our determination.
It is this May a purchaser in possessmion of real property
under an executory contract for the sale thereof, claim a
valid homestead therein?"
Ashford v. Reese' s is cited for the general proposition that under
an executory real estate contract no interest either legal or equitable passes to the vendee, and it is held that although no such
interest is held by the vendee he may nevertheless declare a homestead. While an examination of the original record in the case
discloses that the contract in question did contain a forfeiture
clause, the fact remains that the court presents and discusses the
question generally as applicable to all real estate contracts without
regard to any such criterion as has now been laid down in the recent
case of Aylward v. Lally."
The next case to be considered is Norman v. Levenhagen.5 In
that case again it does not appear from the opinion whether the
contract before the court contained a forfeiture clause or not. As
a matter of fact, the contract was not in the record before the
supreme court. The case turned solely on the question whether
(1927)

2

WASiL

L. lRv. 205.

See note 1, supra.
"See note 45, supra. And see especially the discussion of this case in
footnote 66, infra.
"See note 1, supra.
"See note 2, supra.
See note 45, supra
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the findings supported the judgment, and the findings merely
recited generally that Levenhagan had bought under executory
contract, without even naming the vendor or referring to any
terms of the contract. Again, the deduction to be made from this
case is that at the time that case was decided no such distinction
as has now been laid down in Aylward v. Laity16 occurred to the
court. It should be noted, moreover, that Norman v. Levenhagan5T
was decided by the court en bane.
The next case to be considered is Pratt v. Rhodes.' 8 In that case
the doctrine of Ashford v. Reese" is referred to and discussed at
considerable length in order to demonstrate that the doctrine of
that case does not militate against specific performance of a real
estate contract by the vendee notwithstanding that the contract
vests no title, legal or equitable, in the vendee. The contract involved is fully set forth in the opinion and, remarkable to say,
there is no forfeiture clause or anything that reasonably could be
construed as a forfeiture clause, contained in it. This case, then,
leaves absolutely no question that the doctrine of Ashford v.
Rees. 60 was intended by the court to be generally applicable even
though the contract did not contain a forfeiture clause. Moreover, the case of Pratt v. Rhodes6l was reaffirmed by the court
sitting en bane. In the briefs in that case the forfeiture-clause distinction was at some length championed and resisted by respective
counsel. Appellant argued that since the contract did not contain
a forfeiture clause, the Ashford case did not apply, and in support of this contention relied on several of tbe very cases now
made the basis of the distinction by the court, whereas the respondent argued that all of these cases had been argued to the court M
the Ashford case, and had been there overruled, finding support
only in the dissenting opinion. The court, instead of accepting
the distinction then forcefully pressed upon it, and distinguishmg
the Ashford case on that basis, ignores the claimed distinction, and
at some length points out why the Ashford case does not negative
the right to specific performance. This case leaves absolutely no
question that the forfeiture clause test was not accepted by the
court at the time this case was decided because, the contract in
question not containing a forfeiture clause, an explanation of the
See note 2, supra.

"See note 45, supra.
"See
See
See
' See

note 45, supra.
note 1, supra.
note 1, supra.
note 45, supra.
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doctrine of Ashford v. Reese 2 would have been wholly unnecessary
except on the theory that that doctrine was generally applicable
to all executory contracts without regard to forfeiture clauses. 8
The next case to be discussed is Katetva v. Snyder 4 In that
case the question arose whether the purchaser in possession under
a real estate contract could resist a trespass upon the premises
of which he had possession. The opinion itself is completely silent
on the point whether the contract contained a forfeiture clause.
Ashford v. Reese65 is discussed and the position taken that the doctrine of that case does not prevent a purchaser from exercising such
legal rights as are accorded to him by the possesson 6 which he
'* See note 1, supra.
"It is true that the ser'ond point decided by the court is that upon the
allegations of the pleadings which must be accepted as true, it appears
that the appellants had fully performed the contract and therefore had
acquired an equitable interest in land; but the fact remains that the court
spends a full page in showing why the doctrine of Ashford v. Reese does
not deny the vendee the remedy of specific performance even though he
has no title, legal or equitable, in the premises. Even on the second point
the holding seems questionable, inasmuch as the appellant's answer,
pleaded willingness further to perform, but especially since it seems that
the basic executory contract under which the respondent was buying, and
which he was sharing with the appellant under the separate and independent agreement in suit, was not paid up, so that no title of any character
had yet passed to either respondent or appellant.
" See note 45, sunra. The contract in fact contained a forfeiture
clause.
See note 1, supra.
" At this point it may be noted that the court In announcing the
new rule in Washington has constantly stated rather broadly that the
vendee acquires "no title or interest, either legal or equitable" in land.
See Ashford v. Reese, note 1, supra, In re Kuhn's Estate, note 45, supra,
Desmond v. Shotwell, note 45, supra. In these cases the only question before the court was whether the vendee acquired an equitable title, and
not whether he acquired any legal interest, aside from what may
technically be denominated title. This broad language has got the court
into serious difficulties and has obliged it within the limits of a single
case solemnly to deny the vendee any title or interest, legal or equitable
in lana, and in the next breath to accord him the full legal rights of a
possessor of real property. See Desmond v. Shotuell. note 45, supra,
where the court after first reitErating the broad formulary phrase set down
in Ashford v. Reese, grants the vendee a homestead right, since he "has
a sufficient interest in real property to entitle him to maintain a home
thereon." See also Katetva v. Snyder note 45, supra, where the court,
after citing Ashford v. Reese, holds that a vendee can enjoin a trespass
upon the land because the contract is sufficient upon which the vendee
can base his "right to possession of the land" and sufficient to authorize
the vendee to "forbid any person to interfere with that possession."
Obviously, a vendee who acquires a "right to possession" under his, contract acquires at least a legal interest in land, even though not technically
a title, legal or equitable. The court overlooks completely the traditional
cont ept of "possession" in real property law as an interest in land, yes,
for many purposes, title. See Olson v. Seattle, 30 Wash. 687, 689, 71 Pac.
201 (1903), where the court says, "The right of possession is a sufficient
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acquires under the contract. From the fact that again the existence
or non-existence of a forfeiture clause was not adverted to by the
court it appears quite plain that the criterion which the court has
now seized upon in the recent decision of Aylward v. Lally67 was
not at that time considered of moment.
It has already been heretofore pointed out,8 that prior to Ashford v. Reese 9 the court had held in State ex rel. Trmble v. Superor Court,70 and Olsen v. Seattle,71 in both of which the contracts
involved contained forfeiture clauses, that the purchaser under a
forfeitable executory contract is the owner in equity The remarkable feature of the Trmble72 case is that it expressly repudiates
the doctrine that is now maintained in Ashford v. Reese,7 8 stating
that the doctrine of the vendee's equitable ownership is "so firmly
settled against the contention of the relators by a tram of uncontroverted authority that it is now beyond the realm of legitimate
controversy " The argument arising from these and other cases
will not be here repeated, except to say that if they had not been
lost in the books, the divergences now existing m the form of two
lines of authority would probably not have arisen, Ashford v. Reese
interest therein to enable a person having such right to invoke the
remedies provided by law against a trespasser thereon." And see also
the multitudinous cases in which it is held that possession constitutes
notice of the rights of the possessor, and the myriad cases which bold
that the possession of an adverse possessor is title against all the world
except the true owner. If the court decides to adhere to Ashford v. Reese,
it would undoubtedly be well to discard all the useless and embarrassing
parts of tha formula and confine the case solely to the denial of the doctrine of equitable conversion, I. e., of an equitable title in the vendee. If
this is done, and all the incidents of the right of possession in the law
of real property are kept in mind (possession being always a legal interest
in land, though not always title) the rights of the vendee can be worked
out according to well established concepts. If this is done, the court will
not be further emberrassed by having in one and the same case to deny
the vendee any "interest" in land and still having to protect the vendee
by resorting to the concept of "possession", which constitutes a legal
"interest" in land, though perhaps not always title- In the two cases
above referred to the court was compelled tG resort to this-refuge, although
it apperently was not conscious of the inconsistency involved In denying
the vendee, according to the formula, any "legal interest" and yet resorting to the doctrine of "possession," in the one case at law and in the other
Z"
in equity.
47See note 2, supra.
"(1926) 2 WAsH. L. REv. 1, and see note 27, supra.
See notes 1 and 27, supra.
31 Wash. 445, 72 Pac. 89 (1903).
30 Wash. 687, 71 Pac. 201 (1903).
See notes 27 and 10, supra.
"See notes 1 and 27, supra.
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would probably have been otherwise decided, and the whole present situation been obviated.
From the foregoing review of the cases the following appears
(1) That prior to Ashford v. Reese 14 a number of cases were decided by this court in which the contract in question, although
containing a forfeiture clause, was held to give an equitable title
to the purchaser. These cases are notably, State ex rel. Trnble v.
Superior Court,"5 Olson v. Seattle78 and Roy v. Vaughn."
(2) That the recent decision of Aylward v. Lally, in which the
absence or presence in the contract of a forfeiture clause is laid
down as the determining test, itself cites as support Roy v.
Vaughn,79 in which the contract concerned contained a forfeiture
clause, but in which the contract nevertheless was foreclosed m
equity on the theory that the vendee had an equitable interest
in land that was foreclosable.
(3) That an examination of the opinions in Ashford v. Reese80
seems to indicate that both the majority and the minority of the
court considered the doctrine of the majority as applicable to all
real estate contracts without regard to whether it contained or
did not contain a forfeiture clause, even though the contract then
in question happened to contain a forfeiture clause.
(4) That the cases decided since Ashtford v. Reese,81 in which
that case is cited as authority, plainly indicate that the presence
or absence of a forfeiture clause was not regarded as a deter
mining test, for the reason that the doctrine of that case was applied in the rendition of the decisions where the contract was not
before the court (hence it could not be determined whether it contained a forfeiture clause or not), or where it does not appear from
the opinion whether the contract before the court contained a for
feiture clause or not, or where the contract as set forth m the
opinion affirmatively shows that it contained no forfeiture clause.
It would therefore seem to follow irresistibly from the foregoing
8
analysis that the doctrine of the recent case of Aylward v. Lally,
in which the forfeiture clause is set down as the determining test,
"See note 1, supra.
See
"See
, See
"See
"See

,0See
a'See
"See

notes 27 and 70, supra.
note 71, supra.
note 7, supra.
note 2, supra.
note 7, supra.
note 1, supra.
note 1, supra.
note 2, supra.
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is a new doctrine materially limiting the application of the rule
in Ashford v. Reese"3 and raising new questions of construction
that have not heretofore been considered vital.8 4
Moreover, if the provision in Aylward v. Lally" and the absence
of a forfeiture clause make the contract a mortgage, which the
court at other times has denied, 9 then is foreclosure of the contract
the exclusive remedy, or may the summary remedy agreed to by
"See note 1, supra.
"The clause declared time to be of the essence, entitled vendor to
declare an immediate default, repossess the property, sell the land at
public or private sale and to apply the proceeds on the purchase price. In
substance this seems reasonably close to a forfeiture clause, since the
vendee was summarily deprived of possession and enjoyment. Vendee's
right to the excess, if any, from the resale, perhaps recognized the contract as still in existence, but can hardly be regarded of great value. The
vendee's summary loss of possession on the day of default can hardly be
reconciled with the mortgage statutes under which the mortgagee is
entitled to possession after default until foreclosure sale or later. Rem.
Comp. Stat., Sec. 602.
"See note 2, supra.
"In Barton v. Tombart, note 22, supra, in which the court permitted
foreclosure of a contract not containing a forfeiture clause, the court said:
"The position of the parties on the sale of land on contract have been
likened to that of mortgagor and mortgagee, and theoretically some such
relation is established, but practically the transactions are quite different;
in the case of a mortgage, the purpose of the lender Is to make a profit on
his money by way of interest, and to keep rates of Interest moderate his
protection must be liberal, both as to the margin of security and as to the
obligation of the borrower. In the sale of land on contract, the profit of
the creditor is in the price he secures, and to obtain this he carries the
risk of the margin between the loan value and the selling value of the
property to the extent that he Is not covered by his initial payment
"In the case of mortgage foreclosures we have express statutory direction by sec. 1119, Rem. Comp. Stat., but we do not have any statute rela-

tive to contracts of thts character and as the contract itself makes no
provision for this remedy, the respondent should be confined to the foreclosure of all equity redemption of the appellant in and to the property for
the amount now due upon the contract."
In this respect, then, the en bane decision cf Barton -v.Tombar,
appears to be overruled by Aylward v. ,afly.
The position taken in Barton v. Tombars by the court en bane seems

preferable. A real estate contract is not a mortgage, even though they

may In some respects appear analogous. The instruments are different
and are intended to effect different purposes. If the instrument is a
mortgage, equity will never permit the equity of redemption to be cut off,
whatever may be the summary remedy agreed to by the parties. See
footnote 90. On the other hand, if the instrument is a real estate contract. equity will recognize a forfeiture if agreed to, or any other summary remedy that the parties have contracted for. See Sleeper v. Bragdon,
45 Wash. 562, 88 Pac. 1036 (1907) a specific performance suit by a vendee,
where the court said, "The principles stated by the cited authorities are
sound and reiterate the well-known doctrine that equity abhors a forfeiture, but they do not undertake to change the rule of equity that legal
contracts will be enforced as made and in accordance with the acts of
the parties thereunder." And see 2 WLLISTO. oq CONTRACTS, § 937, for
a summary of the reasons why the vendor is not a mortgagee.
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the parties of immediate repossession and resale be resorted to at
alll'O Moreover, do the aortgage statutes generally apply, and
has the vendee the usual period of redemption? 91 The court
in Aylward v. Lally

2

holds one of the mortgage statutes appli-

93

cable, which it has likewise heretofore denied as to the identical
section,94 sitting en bane, in one of the very cases cited as authority
in the recent case of Aylward v. Lally.95 And in the next succeeding paragraph the court discusses the necessity of tendering a deed
at the time of default, a procedure seemingly inconsistent with the
mortgage concept.
That making the presence or absence of a forfeiture clause the
determining test is not a sound criterion has heretofore been
pointed out9" and will not be here repeated at length. It suffices
to say that it is hardly logical to hold that a forfeiture clause,
which does not purport to make any declaration as to the character
of the title conveyed by the contract, but merely to operate upon
the title conveyed whatever it might be, shall be construed to
determine the very nature of the title conveyed. If so, may it not
,Whether the agreed remedy could be pursued at all was not before
the court because foreclosure of the contract in equity was sought. If it is
a mortgage, it would seem that any summary remedy to defeat the equity
of redemption must on principle be denied. Plummer v. 17se, 41 Wash. 5,
82 Pac. 1009 (1905). However, on principle, if equity recognizes such
instruments to be not strictly mortgages, but legal contracts with a title
reserved in the vendor, and will go to the extent of enforcing a forfeiture
provision in such a contract, it would seem that it will enforce a summary
remedy less stringent in its terms. See last paragraph of footnote 89.
91The predecessors of Aylward v. Lally in the peculiar proceeding of
"foreclosing a real estate contract" do not seem to recognize these rights.
See Taylor v. InterstateInvestment Co., 75 Wash. 490, 135 Pac. 240 (1913)

Roy v. Vaughn, note 7, supra, Barton v. Tombari, see note 22, supra, and
see Stevens v. Irvin, 132 Wash. 289, 231 Pac. 783 (1925). That there is a
misnomer involved in stating that the vendor is foreclosing his "lien"
instead of saying that he is foreclosing the vendee's "equity," see 3
PomERoy, EQ. Jun. (4th Ed.) sections 1260-3.
In Roy v. Vaughn, note 7, supra, amazingly enough, the court permitted 'foreclosure" even though the contract involved contained a forfeiture clause.
See note 2, supra.
" The court says: "Treating the contract, then, as a mortgage, it
clearly appears that, both in the mortgage proper and In the collateral
mortgage, there is an express agreement for the payment of the sum of
money secured, and the case is thus directly within the terms of our
"
statute, Rem. Comp. Stat., sec. 1119 (P C. sec. 8204) which reads:
See note 89, supra, for the decision in which the court, initially
in Department and ultimately en bane, denies the application of sec. 1119,
of the mortgage statutes to "foreclosure" of real estate contracts not
having forfeiture clauses.
See note 2, supra.
(1926) 2 WAsH. L. REv. 1, 9-10.

THE NEW FORFEITURE CLAUSE TEST
be argued with equal force that a lease containing a forfeiture
clause does not convey any element of title to the lessee? Yet it
has never been so held. It does not seem sound in principle to say
that a vendee has no interest in real estate because his interest
may be forfeited. The very provision for forfeiture assumes that
he has an interest and that interest not a mere chattel interest,
but such an interest as the vendee would have under the applicable
law, because the forfeiture clause does not assume to change the
character of the interest acquired by the vendee but merely to
forfeit that interest, whatever the law says it consists of. It is not
the forfeiture clause which ipso facto negatives the vendee's having an equitable interest in land. The same equity jurisprudence
which gives the vendee equitable interest also recognizes the propriety and enforcibility of forfeiture clauses; for while equity
abhors a forfeiture, it will, in a proper case, enforce it."
If the court adheres to the decision in Ashford v. Reese, it would
seem that it would have been preferable to limit that case, not
on the basis of the casual forfeiture feature, but rather on the basis
of the specific question then before the court, viz., risk of loss in
case of destruction of the property without fault of either party
Thus putting the loss on the vendor, without repudiating the doetrine of equitable conversion in its entirety, has the support of an
eminent writer.9 9 From the denial of the doctrine of equitable
conversion as to merely one of the incidents of a real estate contract, viz., risk of loss (in respect to which not all authorities agree
°
that equitable conversion takes place or should control),"" it does
not necessarily follow that the doctrine must be repudiated as to
all the incidents of the vendor-purchaser relationship, that is to
say, that the doctrine must be repudiated completely In re Fields
02
Estate,' which, in spite of Ashford V.Reese,' recognizes equita0,10 R.C.L. 331, and see last paragraph of footnote 89.
See note 1.
Mr. Justice Harlan F Stone, "Equitable Conversion by Contract,"
13 COL. L. REV. 369. For other discussions of the subject see, Samuel Williston, "Risk of Loss After an Executory Contract o1 Sale sn the Common
Law." 9 HABV. L. REv. 106, 111, and 2 Wn~usToiq ON CONTRACTS, secs. .927954, George L. Clark, "'Sone Problems in Specific Performance," 31 HARV.
L. REv. 271, 283; George D. Lantz, "Rights of Vendees Under Executory

Contracts of Sale," 3 WAsH. L. RPv. L
21See note 103.
20See note 48, and main text of this article at the point where that

footnote appears. And see also Roy v. Vaughn, note 7,

tion 1with main text at that footnote.
2 See note 1.

supra, In connec-
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ble conversion in probate, could then be accepted as to its result
although not as to its explanation. If the doctrine of Ashford v.
Reese' 0 ' were so limited, the other incidents of the vendor-purchaser
relationship could be worked out to agree with the general law,without the necessity of continued explanations as to what the logical
consequences of that case are or are not. The proneness to confuse
the old with the new doctrine in this state has already been pointed
out; 04 and, in the attempt to make Ashford v. Reese' 05 generally
applicable, i. e., to repudiate the doctrine of equitable conversion
as to all the incidents of the vendor-purchaser relationship, the
court appears to remain in a continued state of embarrassment, not
so much in its results perhaps, as in its explanations,10 6 explanations which are made only because the court appears to regard the
new doctrine universally applicable to all situations.
Since the court now recognizes equitable conversion in cases of
contracts not containing a forfeiture clause, it might well recognize that doctrine in cases of contracts containing a forfeiture
clause as to other incidents of the relationshlp,' 07 except perhaps 0
as to risk of loss, involved in Ashford v. Reese. 09
Should the rule of Ashford v. Reese"' as recently limited, be
changed either by judicial decision or legislative act? In the
light of the conflicting decisions down to very recent date, and of
the different views which different members of the present court
have entertained at different times, it may perhaps be argued that
no fixed rule of property has been established. 2 Certainly, a
1 See note 1.

"oSee main text in connection with note 48. And see second paragraph of note 114.
"m See note 1.
' See for example Pratt v. Rhodes, note 45 supra, where the court
says: "It is not held that such a contract is a nullity" and then grants
specific performance on grounds but vaguely stated. Obviousiy, the result is correct on a principle sensed, perhaps, by the court but not expressed, viz., that specific performance may be had even though equitable
conversion does not take place. The fiction of equitable conversion Is a
result of the doctrine of specific performance, not a cause of it. The
latter may exist without the former. And see also, Kateiva v. Snyder,
note 45, supra, where the court said, "But we did not hold such a contract
a nullity" see discussion of this case in footnote 45. See also footnote 114.
10,It has done so in Roy v. Vaughn, note 7, supra. And see cases discussed in note 27.
1' See especially note 114 and main text relating thereto, on status of
risk of loss in this state. And see last paragraph of note 45 as to present
status of loss in conditional sales contracts of personalty.
" See note 1.
'" See note 1, supra.
'"The court has not hesitated to overrule cases relating to community
property. Schramn v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 166 Pac. 634 (1917)
Olive
Co. v. Meek, 103 Wash. 467, 175 PAc. 33 (1918).
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review of the cases even since that important decision fails to reveal a satisfactory fixity of principle, in a subject matter in which
fixity and clarity of principle are above all things desirable. Possibly the court has reached a point where it may desire to make a
complete reconsideration of the whole subject. An examination of
the cases shows that virtually every judge that has ever been, or
now is, on the court has at some stage of his judicial career agreed
to the doctrine of equitable conversion in the vendor-purchaser
relationship. And several members of the majority of the court
in the Ashford case have while members of the bench upheld this
anciently established equitable doctrine, even as to contracts containing forfeiture clauses.
A return in this state by judicial action to the well established
equitable rule, it is submitted, would not substantially disturb
property rights. To deprive the vendor of the equitable title
would do him no great harm, inasmuch as his legal title and his
contractual right of forfeiture (which is good even in equity) give
him all the property and protection he needs. However, conversely, to concede the vendee for certain purposes the equitable
title on the theory of equitable conversion even while the contract
is still executory, would do the vendee and third persons considrable good.113 The matter of risk of loss could, if deemed necessary, be otherwise taken care of, as heretofore mentioned, and, anyway, is usually expressly covered by contract or insured against.
Even on this precise subject of xisk of loss, the court has, arguendo,
at least, espoused a rule directly contrary to that of the Ashford
case, in a decision which involved a contract containing a forfeiture clause."" Incidentally a return to the principle of equit22 WAsH. L. REv. 1, at p. 10, last paragraph of article.
And see 2
WILLSTON ON CONTaACTS, sec. 930, where the incidents of equitable conversion are enumerated. The vendee would gain more than he would lose.
"I'State ex rel. Trimble v. Superior Court, 31 Wash. 445. 461, nte 27,
3upra. And see 2 WAsH. L. Rv.1, at pp. 4, 6.
The result reached in Dysart v. Colonial Fire Underwriters,142 Wash.
601, 254 Pac. 240 (1927), a fire insurance case involving the respective
rights of vendor and vendee under an executory forfeitable contract of
sale, really seems to be decided on the doctrine of equitable conversion,
despite Ashford v. Reese, at least, is wholly consistent with the equitable
doctrine. See 5 -PoaEaoY EQ. Jur. (4th Ed.), sec. 2283. The contract
made insurance payable to the corporate vendor "as its Interest may
appear," and the court adjudicates that "interest," notwithstanding the
Ashlford theory, to be a recovery only of the balance of the purchase price
out of the insurance money, the rest of the money going to the vendee.
The result reached in O'N'eil v. Pacific States Fire Ins. Co., 128 Wash.
133, 222 Pac. 215 (1924) is likewise consistent with the equitable conversion theory, though the vendee's insurable interest Is there sustained
largely on the ground of estoppel. See also note 15, last paragraph.
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able conversion would bring the bench and bar of this state back
irto an established and well-charted course of thinking on the
vendor-purchaser relationship. To recede from the doctrine of the
Ashford case would surely not constitute any greater departure
from rules of property than the Ashford case itself constitutes a
departure from the earlier decisions in this state involving executory real estate contracts containing even forfeiture clausesdecisions which it may be assumed had become just as much rules
of property as the Ashford case may now have become, even m its
present somewhat unsettled status,-and decisions which can boast
a better established and much longer line of descent. A recurrence to the equitable rule of the earlier cases would seem less harmful than the departure has been. Certainly the accident of a forfeiture clause has little to commend it as a determining test in this
important field, although the Ashford case, limited to its precise
facts in this regard, to which it does not appear to have been limited
in the subsequent cases, supports such a test.
If, on the other hand, legislation' 1 5 would seem, on the whole,
most desirable,"" it appears that a brief statute instructing the
court to ignore the presence of forfeiture clauses in passing on the
rights of parties under executory contracts, would again make
uniform and clear the law applying to real estate contracts.
ALFRED J Sc0EWEPPE, °

"'In

the Laws of 1927, Ch. 278, p. 670, relating to recording of real

property instruments, the definition of a "conveyance" excludes "an

executory contract for the purchase and sale of lands" (no mention being
made of forfeiture clauses). However, under the act referred to "executory contracts for the sale or purchase of real property" are entitled to
record, "and when so recorded shall be notice to all persons of the rights
of the vendee under the contract." What these rights are, Is not defined
in the statute. If it is claimed that the statute accepts the principle of
Ashford v. Reese, then, in view of this statute, may it be argued that It
is not open to the court to differentiate between them on the basis of the
presence or absence of a forfeiture clause? Or Is a real estate contract
reserving title and providing for future installment payments, but not
containing a forfeiture clause, no longer an "executory contract for the
sale of real estate" but a real estate mortgage? Unless the latter be true,
which the court in Barton v. Tombar, note 89, supra, denied, does the
new recording act itself, by its generic language, repudiate any such disas is laid down in Ayl:oard v. Lally?
tinction
11
In regard to legislation it may be said that legislation would have
the virtue of being prospective only, without affecting existing contracts,
whereas a judicial overruling would be perhaps less lenient in its result,
although as pointed out in the text above, it seems that no really substantial harm would be done thereby.
* Dean of the Law School, University of Washington.

